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News reporting is expensive, yet information wants to be free. This unsettling 
paradox has perplexed everyone who is interested in the future of high-quality 
journalism. How can the news business be re-envisioned in a rapidly changing 
world? Can market incentives and technological imperatives provide a way 
forward? How important were the institutional arrangements that protected 
the production and distribution of news in the past? 
The history of the Anglo-American news business since the seventeenth 
century provides one approach to these questions. From the 1770s until the 
2000s, the dominant news medium in Britain and America was the newspaper, 
by which we mean its print-and-paper incarnation and not its digital off-
spring. For over two centuries, the newspaper provided the people of both 
countries with a steady supply of the time-specific reports on market trends 
and public life that are commonly called news. The news that newspapers 
contained has long been indispensable not only for commerce, the creation of 
an informed citizenry, and the monitoring of the powers-that-be, but also for 
the cultivation of the habits of civic engagement, the fundamental responsi-
bility, in the view of the moral philosopher John Dewey, of journalism in a 
democratic society. 
News, of course, can take a variety of forms and it would be a mistake to 
presume that the newspaper has been the only medium for its circulation. 
Though the newspaper was invented in the seventeenth century, it would take 
over one hundred years for it to triumph over its rivals-the scribal newsletter, 
the pamphlet, the broadside-to become the dominant news medium.1 In fact, 
one of the most surprising facts about the rise of the newspaper is how halting 
it has been. 
Rival news providers never disappeared. From the 1770s until the 2000s, 
newspaper publishers adapted to and, in turn, helped to shape a dazzling array 
of technical contrivances that included low-cost mail delivery, the electric 
telegraph, radio, and television. Yet the newspaper endured. 
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Following the Second World War, the newspaper increasingly found 
itself in competition with television and radio. Even so, it has remained 
a disproportionately important news source. Well into the twenty-first 
Century, ·according to one estimate, newspapers continued to generate 
fully 85 percent of all the information that journalists, pundits, and media 
commentators· would regard as news.2 This is true, even though for several 
decades the single most popular news medium in both Britain and America-
at least, in sheer weight of numbers-has not been not the newspaper, but 
television news.3 Although the viewership of TV news has in recent years 
outpaced newspaper readership, and despite the healthy profits long enjoyed 
by television news divisions, television journalism has disproportionately 
relied on reporting primarily intended for newspapers. In December 1968, 
for example, two news agencies-the Associated Press (AP) and United 
Press International (UPI)-originated 70 percent of all the domestic news 
stories featured on NBC, then one of the nation's two largest television 
networks.4 
. since the 2000s, however, a rising chorus of journalists and media scholars 
in many countries-including Britain and America-have derided "dead-tree 
media" as a doomed genre trapped in a death spiral from which it can never 
recover.5 This is unsurprising: change is disruptive, and social commentators 
make.a living by crafting dramatic narratives with gloomy denouements. 
The rhetoric of newspaper decline in the Anglo-American world is so 
widespread that it has been little shaken by the fact that in countries as 
otherwise different as Germany and India, the future of the print-and-paper 
newspaper currently appears to be robust.6 Sooner or-later, or so commenta-
tors assume, a combination of factors-'-including, above all, the commercial-
ization of the Internet-will doom the medium even in those markets in which 
its financial position now seems secure.7 
Making News is not yet another lament for a world we have lost. News is 
distinct from and more important than newspapers, and the theme of Making 
News is not the rise and fall of the print-and-paper newspaper, but the shifting 
institutional arrangements that since the seventeenth century have protected 
the production and distribution of news. These institutional arrangements 
have taken many forms: advertising, sponsored content, cartels, administrative 
regulations, government monopoly. 
Our theme can be simply put: institutions matter.8 To understand how 
news was made, neither markets nor technology but institutions hold the key. 
By institutions we mean the relatively stable configuration of laws, adminis-
trative protocols, organizational templates, and cultural conventions that 
facilitate or impede the production and distribution of news. Institutional 
arrangements have been, on balance, more important than market incentives 
and technological imperatives in creating and sustaining the organizational 
capabilities necessary for high.quality journalism. High-quality journalism is 
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built on independent reporting and independent reporting rests on a solid 
base of financial support. 
The problems confronting the news business involve the interplay of four 
distinct elements: technological innovation, business strategy, professional 
norms, and public policy. Making News explores the interplay of these four 
elements in two countries over three hundred years. Interplay is the key. 
Journalism has always been a challenging business to understand because it 
is a "public good" in two distinct ways. Economists use the term "public good" 
to characterize a product or service that is not depleted when it is consumed. 
News is such a service. Once news is produced and distributed, it can be 
endlessly circulated. For news provid~rs to operate a sustainable business is 
not easy; in fact, the very magnitude of the challenge helps explain why they 
have so often created institutional arrangements to insulate themselves from 
the market. 
The term "public good" has a second meaning. For it also denotes a product 
or service that is clothed in the public interest, in the sense that it is vital to the 
civic life of.a city, region, or nation. Public goods are magnets for intervention 
· by governments, political parties, and interest groups of all kinds. It is partly 
for this reason that journalism is so preoccupied with ethical norms: high-
quality journalism is journalism that is infused with a public purpose. 
This ever-shifting array of civic ideals, ethical norms, and institutional 
arrangements-public, private, and in between-is what we call the political 
economy of journalism. The political economy of journalism in the opening 
decades of the twentieth century is rooted in decisions made long in the past. 
To understand where we are going, it is useful to know where we have been. 
Making News is a collection of original essays on the institutional arrange-
ments that news providers in Britain and America have relied on since the late 
seventeenth century to facilitate the production and distribution of news. Our 
purpose is neither elegiac nor encyclopedic. Rather, we have recruited a 
distinguished team of specialists to analyze key junctures in the history of 
the news business, with a focus on the big picture. Each essay is explicitly 
comparative and each considers a relatively long time-span. While the essays 
differ in emphasis and tone, each analyzes the institutional arrangements that 
long sustained the dominant position of the newspaper as a news medium. 
Some were legally binding, and, thus, overtly public; others were purely 
customary and thus typically categorized as private. Whether public, private, 
or something in between, these institutional arrangements established for 
news providers the rules of the game. 
Among the questions we have asked our authors to consider are: Who paid 
for the news? What institutional arrangements facilitated its collection, cur-
ation, and circulation? How did these institutional arrangements interact with 
technological imperatives and market incentives? How did they inform the 
ideological commitments of journalists? 
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It is appropriate to focus on Britain and America for several reasons. First, 
each country boasts a long history of independent newspaper-based reporting, 
a journalistic genre that is critically dependent on the organizational capabil-
ities that only a well-staffed newsroom has been able to sustain; and, second, 
the advertising revenue that newspaper publishers relied on in each of these 
countries to staff these newsrooms is in steep decline. Our comparative 
approach has the additional advantage of showing how the political economy 
shaped the news business. Though British and American journalism have 
much in common-each places a high value on independent reporting and 
each has been highly commercialized since the seventeenth century-the rules 
of the game for news providers in the two countries have often diverged. 
A case in point is the contrasting institutional arrangements that British and 
American news providers devised to facilitate the reporting of international 
news. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, powerful news agencies-the 
Press Association (PA) and Reuters in the United Kingdom and the New York 
Associated Press (NYAP) and its successor the AP in the United States-long 
coordinated international news cartels that lowered the cost of news for 
many newspapers. In Britain, non-London newspapers obtained overseas 
news at rock-bottom rates, thanks to the hefty cross-subsidies paid to the PA 
by the London press, the colonial press, and certain colonial governments. 
In the United States, in contrast, AP member newspapers obtained a steady 
diet of time-specific news reports that the AP refused to distribute to rival 
non-AP newspapers. Not until 1945 would the United States Supreme 
Court finally ban the AP from limiting the circulation of its news reports ' 
to· member newspapers, overturning over a century-of market-channeling 
institutional arrangements that had been no less consequential for the news 
business in the United States than the monopoly grant held by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had been for the news business in the 
United Kingdom. 
Two dates serve as bookends for our project: 1688 and 1995. In 1688, 
the English Parliament deposed James II in favor of William of Orange in 
an event widely regarded as a critical juncture in British history. Known as the 
"Glorious Revolution," this event was a largely peaceful transfer of power that 
ensured that the monarchy would remain Protestant and that the Crown's 
authority would be constrained by Parliament, which reaffirmed its preroga-
tive as the supreme power in the land. This event is mostly remembered for 
shifting the balance of power towards Parliament and away from the Crown. 
Yet it also had major consequences for the press. By enshrining religious 
toleration as a civic ideal, Parliament delegitirnized long-standing institutional 
constraints on the circulation of information. Prior to 1688, every book, 
pamphlet, or newspaper published in England had to be licensed by a 
government censor prior to its publication. The Protestant succession and 
Parliamentary supremacy cleared the way for the refusal by Parliament in 
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1695 to renew legislation requiring the pre-publication licensing of printed 
items, including newspapers. In so doing, Parliament helped birth a new 
kind of public sphere that would hasten the rise of the newspaper as the 
dominant medium for the circulation of news.9 
To peg to a single year the beginnings of the rise of the newspaper over its 
rivals as the dominant news medium is of course an· oversimplification. The 
newspaper would not become the dominant news medium until tl1e 1770s. 
Even so, there is good reason to credit the Glorious Revolution with enduring 
consequences for journalism. Much the same can be said about 1995. Just as 
the events of 1688 facilitated the rise of the newspaper as the dominant news 
medium, so the events of 1995 accelerated its decline. For it was in that year 
that the National Science Foundation in the United States permitted busi-
nesses to commercialize the digital computer network popularly known as the 
Internet, hastening a remarkable proliferation of information on all manner of 
topics, including news. Much of this information could be obtained free of 
charge, undercutting the rationale for a newspaper subscription. No less 
importantly, the Internet created a vast and rapidly growing on!ine classified 
advertising business that eroded the de facto spatial monopoly that news-
papers traditionally enjoyed over the placement of classified advertisements, a 
major source of revenue for over two hundred years. Of course, splashy 
display advertisements remain in the 2010s a stable revenue source for many 
print-and-paper newspapers. Yet even here, it would seem likely that a sea 
change from print to digital is well underway. 
The decline of the print-and-paper newspaper predated the Internet. In 
both Britain and America, per capita newspaper circulation had been drop-
ping for decades, partly due to shifting social norms, and partly due to the rise 
of broadcast news. The Internet accelerated this downward trend, not only 
because it provided audiences with a cheaper news source, but also because it 
has emerged as a superior vehicle for classified advertisements. 
The following seven chapters survey the shifting institutional arrangements 
that facilitated the production and distribution of news in Britain and America 
in the period between 1688 and 1995. An eighth ·chapter surveys the news 
business following the commercialization of the Internet, and the epilogue 
links past, present, and future. 
While the chapters defy brief summary, four themes stand out. The first is the 
pervasiveness in the news business of cross-subsidies; the second is the divergent 
priorities of lawmal<ers in Britain and America; the third is the influence on 
business strategy of political economy; and the fourth is the fallacy of what 
English social historian E. P. Thompson called the "rationalist illusion," that is, 
the presumption that the elimination of constraints on the production and 
distribution of news, such as, for example, the abolition of newspaper taxes in 
nineteenth-century Britain, would more-or-less automatically create the neces-
sary preconditions for high-quality journalism.10 · 
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The pervasiveness of cross-subsidies in the news business is a theme that 
unites almost every chapter in the volume, with the possible exception of the 
chapter on the immediate post-Second World War era. To borrow from 
the language of the economist: in the news business, oligopoly has been the 
rule and competition the exception, and barriers to entry have been indispens-
able to the consistent production of high-quality journalism. Free trade in news 
has always been a fiction. Collaboration and collusion ordinarily have been the 
norm, and the freewheeling bottom-up creativity that many associate with 
the Internet an aberration. High~quality news reporting is expensive and the 
organizational capabilities necessary to sustain high-quality journalism require 
a stable long-term investment that is difficult to monetize. To complicate 
matters still further, with the exception of certain kinds of commercial infor-
mation; the demand for news has rarely generated enough revenue to cover its 
cost. As a consequence, news providers have typically relied on subsidies of 
various kinds to balance the books. On the production side, news cartels divided 
the market; on the distribution side, advertisers subsidized reporting. 
The pervasiveness of these cross-subsidies underscores the dependence of 
news· providers on some kind of commercial quid pro quo. Here it is import-
ant to make a basic distinction. Notwithstanding the challenges that Anglo-
American news providers have confronted in matching costs and revenue, the 
news business has long been a commercial venture. Indeed, the presumption 
that the news has been only recently commercialized-a tenet of much 
historical writing on this topic in Britain and America, and a premise of a 
celebrated philosophical treatise on the press by the German philosopher 
Jiirgen Habermas-has surprisingly little historical warrant." On the con-
trary, news has been a business since the seventeenth century, and commercial 
considerations have shaped the business strategy of news providers for over 
three hundred years.12 These commercial considerations, it is worth empha-
sizing, have typically had little relationship to the oft-touted emancipatory 
potential for high-quality journalism of an unfettered marketplace of ideas. 
Indeed, the very presumption that there has existed anything like an open 
marketplace of ideas in the news business is hard to square with the evidence. 
Every kind of news-including, in particular, financial news-has been long 
subject to subtle and not-so-subtle manipulation by self-interested parties: 
sponsored content is nothing new.13 A very different kind of manipulation 
shaped the distribution of news: beginning in the nineteenth century, news 
providers routinely colluded with news agencies-and, in the late nineteenth-
century United States, network providers-to limit access to news reports.14 In 
addition, and perhaps most important of all, high-quality journalism has 
flourished best in organizations that proved the most successful at keeping 
market forces at bay. 
To be sure, Anglo-American journalism has only rarely sanctioned direct 
state control. With the notable.exceptions of the BBC in the United Kingdom 
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and National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 
in the United States, the news business in both countries has primarily 
devolved on for-profit commercial ventures that are largely, though not 
exclusively, independent of the state. Even so, the news business in Britain 
and America has been protected from market competition by a variety of 
institutional arrangements. Each had the effect, as was often its intention, of 
protecting incumbents from new entrants. Jn the news business, protection 
is a form of subsidy, competition between news providers is often contrived, 
and the cost of supplying the news has often exceeded the demand for its 
provision. . 
The financial precariousness of the news business is worth emphasizing, 
given the propensity of twenty-first-century media analysts to regard the half-
century that followed the end of Second World War in 1945 as the baseline for 
future-oriented projections. Few assumptions have done more to obfuscate the 
challenging question of how it will remain possible to sustain high-quality 
independent journalism, including, in particular, investigative reporting.15 In 
fact, if one tal<es the long view, the one period during which news providers 
consistently generated impressive profits-that is, the five post-Second-
World-War decades-was the least typical. A more appropriate baseline for 
the future might be the United States in the early republic, a period in which 
public policy hastened the oversupply of news, an outcome that, as many 
contemporary chroniclers observed, limited its influence and undercut its 
authority. 
A second theme that runs through the chapters in this volume is the 
divergent priorities of lawmal<ers in Britain and America. Media scholars 
interested in comparatiVe ·media systems often lump together Britain and 
America as exemplars of a single, market-oriented liberal model.16 This is 
true even for those scholars who are attuned to the sometimes subtle but by no 
means insignificant differences in the legal standing of journalism in British 
and American law.17 The chapters in this volume, in contrast, show how the 
political economy of journalism in Britain and America shaped the business 
strategy of news providers. By considering the political economy as an agent of 
change, rather than merely as the aggregation of specific political decisions, the 
contributors demonstrate that British lawmakers have been consistently more 
willing to support centralized news providers than lawmakers in the United 
States. As a consequence, the news business in the United States has been more 
variegated and, especially early on, more financially precarious. 
Jn explaining the evolution of the news business in Britain and America, our 
contributors have not focused exclusively on political factors. On the contrary, 
and in the best tradition of historical writing on economic institutions, they 
have probed the interrelationship of politics, technology, the economy, and 
ideology. Even so, in both Britain and America the structuring presence of the 
state has loomed large. For example, even ostensibly non-political decisions, 
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such as the acquiescence of lawmakers in cartel agreements that contempor-
aries regarded as private, presupposed a raft of assumptions about the rela-
tionship of government and the press that had major implications for the 
provisioning of news. 
A third theme that unites the chapters in this volume is the relationship 
between political economy and business strategy. The business strategy of 
news providers has been shaped not only or even primarily by the supposedly 
unstoppable juggernaut of market incentives and technological imperatives, 
but also by the structuring presence of governmental institutions and civic 
ideals. The political economy has shaped the business strategy of news pro-
viders by encouraging certain business practices and discouraging others. 
Particularly important has been the implicit political endorsement of the 
distinctive, yet complementary, cartel agreements that have strengthened 
the organizational capabilities of news agencies in the United Kingdom and 
the United States: the PA and Reuters in the United Kingdom; the NY AP and its 
successor, the AP, in the United States. 
The influence of civic ideals on the business strategy of news providers 
has ·informed the journalistic output of reform-minded editors in Britain, 
America, and Britain's colonial possessions. For the nineteenth-century liberals 
C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian and Joseph Medill of the Chicago 
Tribune, urban politics fostered new forms of civic engagement. For Mahatma 
Gandh~ British imperialism emboldened a twentieth-century anti-colonial 
journalist to popularize an innovative form of nonviolent popular protest.18 
A final theme that ties these chapters together is the fallaciousness of the 
common presumption that government policies designed to facilitate access to 
information will automatically generate useful ·knowledge. This presumption 
helped inspire the successful popular protest in Britain during the 1830s 
against the taJCes that the government levied on newspapers; it would recur 
in the 1860s during the public debate that culminated in the government 
purchase of the electric telegraph. This presumption has re-emerged among 
proponents of"net neutrality," a principle that is sometimes invoked as a cure-
all for almost everything critics find objectionable about the current digital 
media environment. Taken together, the chapters in this volume raise ques-
tions about this presumption. If newsgathering has almost always been 
collaborative-and, indeed, often monopolistic-then it would seem to be 
more constructive for lawmal<ers to encourage journalistic cooperation than 
to assume, in flat contradiction of the historical record, that a swarm of nimble 
digital start-ups can supersede the lumbering journalistic behemoths of 
the past. 
The presumption that the news business can flourish in a marketplace of 
ideas has long been a civic ideal. In practice, however, the emergence begin-
ning in 1995 of what can be plausibly characterized as a genuinely competitive 
marketplace for the production and distribution of news has limited the 
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resources for high-quality news reporting. Much would be gained, and little 
lost, if we abandoned the marketplace of ideas metaphor and replaced it with 
an alternative, such as public utility, civic engagement, or even the creation of 
an informed citizenry. For the production of high-quality journalism is a 
byproduct less of the market than of the acquiescence of lawmakers in the 
market-channeling business strategies that have transformed journalism in 
the past, and will in all lil<elihood transform it once again in the future. 
The rise of the newspaper in the period between 1688 and the start of the 
American War of Independence in 1775 is the topic of Will Slauter's chapter 
on the early modern news business. Lil<e so many innovations in the history of 
Anglo-American journalism, this development received a major impetus from 
institutional arrangements that had little to do with market demand. Printers 
benefited from taJC loopholes, the awarding of special privileges by government 
officials, and the lapse of pre-publication censorship in 1695. Even after 1695, 
printers who circulated information on sensitive topics remained vulnerable to 
arrest and imprisonment, but they could no longer be blocked in advance 
from publishing information on market trends and public affairs. 
For a time, it was unclear if newspapers would win out in the multimedia 
contest with pamphlets, magazines, broadsides, and scribal newsletters. Few 
barriers to entry existed-in contrast to, say, the nineteenth century, when the 
widespread adoption of the steam press greatly increased the capital costs of 
publishing a newspaper. Even so, newspapers had a critical advantage that 
other media lacked: they offered advertisers a tool to reach a large and varied 
audience quickly and cheaply. Advertisements, crowed one printer in 1769, 
were the "Life of a Paper.'' Not surprisingly, advertisers-including, for example, 
London theater owners, eager to fill their seats-invested heavily in newspapers, 
helping to ensure that they would prosper. Right from the start, printers sold 
not only news, but also the attention of a captive audience for advertisers, and, to 
an extent that is often forgotten, it was the captive audience. and not the news 
that paid the bills. 
The political economy for journalism that Slauter describes differed in 
several respects from the political economy of the more recent past The 
most obvious contrast was the limited investment in reporting. The financial 
resources that printers allocated for newsgathering went not to reporters, an 
occupational category that had yet to exist, but to the procurement of other 
publications, which printers mined for suitable material. Eventually, this task 
would devolve on a specialist known as the "editor," ~n occupational title that 
in Britain had come into use by the 1760s. Most contributors, who were known 
as letter writers ·or "correspondents," were unpaid, and it was not at all 
uncommon for government insiders to pay the newspaper to insert a paragraph 
surreptitiously to influence public opinion on one of the public issues of the 
day. In the absence of the unpaid labor of the letter-writers, the extensive 
participation by readers in newsgathering, and the ubiquitous sharing of news 
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items between newspapers-features of the eighteenth-century press that in 
some ways mimic digital media conventions-it would have been hard to 
envision the newspaper emerging as the dominant news medium in the 
Anglo-American world. 
Among the proudest legacies of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment was 
the opening to journalists of the ongoing deliberations of the national legisla-
ture: Parliament in Britain; Congress in America. Few developments did more 
to facilitate the systematic, ongoing coverage of public affairs. In Britain, this 
innovation occurred in the 1770s, when, following a political struggle, jour-
nalists got access to Parliament; in the United States, it occurred in a six-year 
period between 1789 and 1795. In 1789, journalists obtained access to the 
House of Representatives, in keeping with what lawmakers assumed to be the 
protocols appropriate to a government established by a popular mandate under 
the federal Constitution; six years later, they also got access to the Senate. The 
results of this innovation were subtle, yet profound. In Britain, the opening of 
Parliament to journalists helped to spur a reorientation in the coverage of 
public affairs away from international relations and back again toward national 
politics. In the United States, it focused the press on the national government, a 
circumstance that, given the decentralized, federal structure of the American 
polity, was by no means preordained. 
The opening of the national legislature to journalists coincided with the 
expansion of the newspaper during the "Age of Revolution," an epoch that 
began with the outbreal< of the American War of Independence in 177 5 
and ended with the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815. In both Britain and 
America-as Joseph Adelman and Victoria Gardner contend in their chapter 
on the news business in this period-it now became not only possible, but also 
obligatory, for journalists to report extensively on national public affairs. To 
meet this demand for up-to-date information, news providers in each country 
invented a new vocatio.n: the stenographic reporter. In Britain, Parliamentary 
reporters remained subordinate to the authors of the anonymous "para-
graphs" that printers inserted into newspapers. In the United States, in 
contrast, a small number of journalists-led by Joseph Gales, Jr, the son of a 
radical printer from Sheffield, England, who had fled from Britain to the 
United States-became influential for transcribing and then printing the 
debates of Congress, a role that Gales himself performed with distinction for 
many years. 
While the opening of the national legislature highlighted commonalities 
between British and American public policy, other legislative initiatives 
pushed journalism in different directions. In Britain, press freedom was rooted 
in privilege. To limit the circulation of subversive ideas, early nineteenth-
century lawmakers charged a heavy tax on newsprint and newspaper advert-
isements, increasing production costs. Advertising remained vitally important, 
since subscriptions barely covered the tax-augmented production costs. Yet 
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the impact of these taxes affected different' journalists in different ways. 
Insurgents confronted prohibitively high barriers to entry while incumbents 
thrived. Among the winners was the well-established London-based Times, 
which took advantage of its privileged position to assert its political independ-
ence from the powers-that-be, encouraging the ascendancy of the editor over 
the printer within the journalistic craft, and buttressing the emerging concep-
tion of the newspaper press as a semi-autonomous "fourth estate." 
In the United States, in contrast, the political economy of journalism 
hastened a flood of newspapers that was without parallel in world history. 
Here press freedom rested not in privilege, but in opportunity. Paradoxically, 
however, opportunity only rarely translated into commercial success. In 
America, as in Britain, advertising revenue remained important for the pub-
lishers' bottom line. Yet for many news providers, advertising and subscrip-
tions were not enough. Political subventions, mostly in the form of 
government printing contracts and government advertising, provided many 
news providers with the additional revenue they needed to stay afloat. 
The remarkable proliferation of newspapers in the United States during the 
early republic owed much to public policy. Most obvious was the absence of 
the onerous newspaper taxes that had limited the circulation of newspapers in 
Britain. Even more important was ihe Post Office Act of 1792, which lavishly 
subsidized the newspaper press. 
The Post Office Act of 1792 is much less well known than the First 
Amendment to the federal Constitution, with its stirring paean to the freedom 
of the press. Yet for well over a century, the Post Office Act had a much more 
immediate and enduring influence on the news business. The First Amend-
ment would only become important for the press when it became invoked in 
constitutional jurisprudence. And this took a surprisingly long time: the 
United States Supreme Court would not hear its first First Amendment case 
until the First World War, and it would not be until the 1960s that the 
judiciary invested the freedom of the press with the quasi-superstitious aura 
that has enshrouded it ever since. The Post Office Act of 1792, in contrast, 
exerted a pervasive influence on the press from the moment of its enactment. 
Three provisions of the Post Office Act proved to be especially indispens-
able for news providers. First, Congress admitted every newspaper printed in 
the country into the mail at extremely low rates, a policy that was at this time 
unprecedented anywhere else in the world; second, it permitted printers to 
send an unlimited number of newspapers through the mail to other printers 
without any charge whatsoever, massively subsidizing news distribution; and, 
third, it instituted a mechanism to facilitate the rapid expansion of the postal . 
network that led inexorably to the enormous proliferation of postal routes 
throughout the vast American hinterland.19 Just as the Internet is rapidly 
emerging as an indispensable platform for commerce and public life, so the 
postal network became in Alexis de Tocqueville's America the operating 
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system for the world's first mass democracy, a world in which the small-town. 
post office supplanted the big-city coffee house as the iconic communications 
node of the age.20 
The modern daily newspaper was born in the 1870s in the burgeoning 
industrial cities of Britain and America. This is the provocative claim of David 
Paul Nord's chapter on the news business in the Victorian city. Newspapers in 
Chicago, St. Louis, and Manchester, England, popularized a new, distinctively 
urban style of journalism, rooted in the civic ideals of the Enlightenment, that 
linked .the big-city newspaper with the prosperity of the cities in which they 
were published. The political economy of the industrial city became the 
journalists' "beat." Buttressed by stable subscription lists and healthy adver-
tising revenues, these newspapers exemplified the "new journalism" that the 
English cultural critic Matthew Arnold decried. At their core, these news-
papers were defined not by the philistine superficiality that Arnold deplored, 
but by their dual role as commercial enterprises and civic boosters. Early on, 
the Chicago Tribune and its English cousin, the Manchester Guardian, cham-
pioned the highly individualistic, anti-interventionist economic liberalism 
known in Britain as laissez faire and in America as antimonopoly. Over 
time, however, even some of the most ardent champions of private enterprise 
and economic liberalism came to embrace a much more collectivistic under-
standing of political economy. This new sensibility, rooted in the commercial 
realities of the industrial city, would prove even more consequential for the 
press than the two journalistic innovations (both American) to emerge in the 
same period: the first-person interview and the investigative expose. Labeled 
by contemporaries the "New Liberalism" in Britain .and "progressivism" in 
America, this city-centric reform agenda would shape the public debate on the 
government regulation of big business in the two decades preceding the First 
World War. To solve the problems of the day, journalists combined a faith in 
discussion, negotiation, and the rational arbitration of conflict with an almost 
irrational faith in the efficacy of facts. Of every three stories on public affairs to 
appear in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in 1894-5, one was on municipal utilities: 
for the first time in history, news reporting had come to focus on infrastruc-
tural improvements in a specific locality. 
The newspapers that Nord describes were both politically influential and 
commercially successful. Yet their newsgathering apparatus remained 
restricted primarily to the locality in which they were published. How, then, 
did journalists gather news on events that originated at a distance? This 
question furnishes the theme for James R. Brennan's chapter on the business 
of.international news in the half-century before the First World War. The 
"Age of Empire," as this period has come to be known, witnessed the heyday of 
imperial expansion for the United Kingdom and the first major overseas war 
for the United States. The international news that found its way into the leading 
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Joseph Pulitzer's World in New York-was often generated by a new 
institution-the international news agency-that took advantage of the 
novel facilities for high-speed communications that had been created by 
the electric telegraph, a new medium that by the 1890s linked the world in 
a single global network. In Britain and America the most important of 
these news agencies-the PA and Reuters in Britain; the NY AP and its 
twentieth-century successor, the AP, in the United States-relied on distinct 
yet complementary business strategies to provide newspaper readers with 
international news. 
The quality of the news that these news agencies provided was highly 
uneven. Newspaper coverage of the Boer War in Britain and the Spanish-
American War in the United States was notoriously bigoted and unfair. Yet in 
no obvious sense was it market-driven. Rather, it was the logical byproduct of 
the institutional arrangements that newspaper publishers devised to supersede 
the exigencies of the market. 
Then, as now, news agencies were bedeviled by a conundrum. How would 
they be remunerated for gathering a commodity-news-that lost its com-
mercial value the instant it was made public? Information of enormous value 
to readers could not be monetized once it had found its way into print. To 
make matters even more complicated, at no point did the demand for inter-
national news match the cost of its supply. In the period between 1869 and 
1915, Reuters's news business generated less than 2 percent of the company's 
total profits. To generate the revenue necessary to cover international news, 
Reuters and the PA relied on government subventions, cross-subsidies from the 
London and colonial press and other lines of business, and cartel agreements 
with their principal rivals (Wolff in Germany; Havas in France). The NY AP and 
the AP adopted a different strategy. By limiting their dispatches to member 
newspapers, they created a tradable asset-exclusivity-that justified the fees 
they charged for access to their newsfeed.21 
In the twentieth century, the newspaper would be challenged but not 
overtal<en as a vehicle for news reporting by broadcasting-first radio, and 
eventually television. Radio news, as Michael Stamm demonstrates in his 
chapter on the news business in the period between the first commercial 
radio broadcasts in 1920 and the Second World War, augmented but did 
not supplant news reporting by newspapers. 
The boundaries between news broadcasting and newspaper news owed 
much to the institutional arrangements that lawmakers devised. These insti-
tutional arrangements had certain common features: in both Britain and 
America, lawmakers claimed as a government monopoly the electromagnetic 
spectrum. In neither country was it possible for a business or individual to 
own a radio frequency, and every radio station had to obtain a license. The 
regulatory differences, however, were equally marked. In Britain, Parliament 
also established a monopoly over radio licences, which was coordinated by the 
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BBC. In the United States, in contrast, Congress opposed a government broad-
casting monopoly, and, as an alternative, empowered a regulatory agency to 
grant broadcasting licenses to as many stations as the agency presumed to be 
technically feasible. 
Once again, in yet another variation on a pattern that went back to the 
Enlightenment, British lawmaking fostered centralization and American law-
making decentralization. The outcomes for journalism, however, were quite 
different. In late eighteenth-century Britain, centralization encouraged news 
· reporting; in the 1920s, however, it did not. Fearful that the BBC would 
compete with their o-WU news reporting, British newspaper publishers suc-
cessfully blocked it from entering the news business. Ironically, the establish-
ment by Parliament of a monopoly radio broadcaster had led British 
newspaper publishers to persuade lawmakers to strengthen their monopoly 
over the news business. The limitations on radio broadcasting were made 
evident in one notorious instance in 1926, when, to mollify British newspaper 
publishers, the BBC broadcast the sounds of the horses' hooves beating against 
the track during the Epsom Derby, but not the result of the race. For many 
years thereafter, newspaper publishers would successfully limit the character 
and scale of the news reporting that the BBC could undertake. These restraints 
were not lifted until the Second World War, when the vivid BBC radio 
broadcasts of journalists such as Richard Dimbleby convinced British law-
makers that it was politically necessary for the public to listen in real time to 
the sounds of the war on the radio as well as to read about the war in the 
newspaper and to see it at the movies, in the short features known as 
newsreels. 
' , In the United States, in contrast, lawmakers refrained from imposing any 
limitations on the kinds of news that radio announcers could report22 Yet this 
did not mean that the news business evolved in the absence oflegal constraint 
or the intervention of newspaper publishers. In Britain, radio broadcasting 
was a government-licensed monopoly. In the United States, newspaper pub-
lishers quickly came to hold licenses for a substantial percentage of radio 
stations. Predictably, newspaper publishers were eager to exploit the commer-
cial potential of the new medium, and American radio stations were much 
more aggressive than the BBC in broadcasting news reports and covering live 
events. CBS reporter Edward R. Murrow was but the most accomplished of a 
generation of talented American on-air news journalists to emerge at this time. 
The influence of public policy on the news business was far less obtrusive in 
the half-century between 1945 and 1995, according to James L. Baughman in 
his chapter on this period. Yet it was never entirely absent. In both countries, 
this half-century witnessed the deregulation of broadcast news, a development 
that would fill the coffers of news moguls while weakening the organizational 
capabilities of the major news networks. In Britain, the BBC lost its TV 
broadcasting monopoly in 1954 and its radio broadcasting monopoly in 
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1971; in the United States, the "Fairness Doctrine"-which, by obliging radio 
and television broadcasters to air multiple viewpoints, had the unintended 
effect oflimiting the range of opinions that they felt it prudent to express-was 
eliminated in 1987. 
The deregulation of the news business helped explain why it had become so 
lucrative. On both sides of the Atlantic, media mogul Rupert Murdoch became 
a household name while television broadcasters and newspaper publishers 
reaped huge profits. This was not the first epoch in which the news business 
had been highly lucrative. ,A century earlier, Pulitzer and Harmsworth had 
made good money running big-city newspapers. Yet the post-Second World 
War profits spurred by the steady upsurge in advertising revenue was unpre-
cedented, and, in certain respects, misleading. As the number of newspapers in 
a particular city dwindled, the advertising revenue increased substantially for 
those that remained, leading to a temporary burst of innovative news report-
ing. Only after the commercialization of the Internet in 1995 did the financial 
prospects of the surviving newspapers significantly decline, leading fo further 
cuts in newsroom staffs and overseas reporting. In this context, it is worth 
recalling just how recent all this is: the peak year for newspaper advertising 
revenue in the United States was 2005.23 
The legal strategies news providers deployed to protect the commercial 
value of news reporting is the theme of the final two chapters, by Heidi 
J. S. Tworek and Robert G. Picard. Each focuses on a different period: Tworek 
on the post-electric telegraph, pre-1995 past; Picard on the post-Internet 
present. Among the themes ,that they explore is the relative merit of licensing 
versus copyright as legal strategies and the peculiar challenges that news 
providers confront in their determination to protect their news stories from 
unauthorized use. In the pre-1995 period, news providers relied on the 
exclusivity of their newsfeeds to protect their organizational capabilities, a 
business strategy that received a major impetus following. the rise of the 
modern metropolitan newspaper in the 1870s. As print runs became larger 
and the news business more capital-intensive-a shift that had been spurred in 
part by the widespread adoption of technical contrivances such as mechanical 
typesetting and the high-speed steam-powered printing press-news agencies 
in Britain and America devised exclusionary business strategies that enabled 
news publishers to block their rivals from gaining access to time-specific 
information. Since 1995, in contrast, the commercialization of the Internet 
has made it more difficult to perpetuate the exclusion:iry business strategies 
that served news providers so well in the past. 
News providers have always looked to legal institutions to protect them-
selves from competition, Tworek observes. Yet certain strategies have been 
more successful than others. In the interwar period, for example, the British 
news agency Reuters and its American rival the AP each lobbied international 
standard-setting organizations to transform news reports into a form of 
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property that governmental institutions would protect. In the end, however, 
this legal strategy came to naught. Far more successful was the adoption by 
news providers of a cartel-based business strategy that was closely aligned with 
the political economy of the countries in which they were based. 
The limitations of copyright as a panacea for the problems facing twenty-
first-century news providers is emphasized by Picard in his chapter. on the 
news business since 1995. News providers intent on protecting their intellec-
tual assets would be well advised, in his view, to scale back on their efforts to 
make copyright a trump, and focus attention instead on the establishment of 
licensing agreements similar to those that had worked so well for news 
providers in the past. 
"A second theme that Picard explores is the decline of the print-and-paper 
newspaper. Recent events, including, but by no means confined to, the com-
mercialization of the Internet, are bringing to a close an epoch in the history of 
news that goes back to the Enlightenment. There are simply too many news 
providers and too few barriers to entry for incumbent news providers to retain 
their privileged position. As a consequence, the badly frayed lifeline between 
the production of news and the publication of newspapers has finally snapped. 
The future remains open. It is hard to know how lawmakers will respond, 
should digital aggregators carve out for themselves a dominant position in the 
news distribution business and Internet service providers occupy the same 
functional niche in the political economy once filled by telecommunications 
giants such as the Bell System. Even so, it seems safe to predict that the 
audience for print-and-paper newspapers will continue to decline, and that 
digital media, including mobile devices, will become increasingly ubiquitous. 
It also seems likely that in the future the news business will focus less on the 
news flash and more on specialized reporting, and that news providers will 
monitor ever more systematically their audience and its engagement. The 
most trusted, enterprising, and ambitious of these news providers will almost 
certainly be relatively large, and perhaps even oligopolistic. 
While the future remains open, much can be learned from the past. The 
chapters that follow have been written with this goal in mind. 
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The Rise of the Newspaper 
Will Slauter 
In the late seventeenth century, most news-defined as timely reports on 
public affairs and commerce-did not appear in newspapers. The monarchy, 
church, and Parliament closely mollitored discussions of politics and religion. 
In most years, the official London Gazette (1666-present) remained the only 
printed newspaper. A tiny elite paid for access to fuller reports found in 
handwritten newsletters, which were compiled in London by individuals 
with access to the diplomatic correspondence of the monarchy and free use 
of the royal post Merchants also relied on weekly periodicals called price 
currents for updates on the prices of goods in various markets. But when it 
came to distributing news in print, periodicals were not as common as separate 
pamphlets, which could be produced quicl<ly and sold cheaply on the streets, 
and broadsides, which contained words and images printed on one side of a 
sheet so that they could be attached to a wall or post for public viewing. 
By the late eighteenth century, the business and culture of news had 
changed substantially. Admittedly, local news still traveled by word of 
mouth, friends in other places still provided details that could not be found 
in print, and pamphlets remained important tools of political persuasion. But 
by 1775 newspapers printed on a regular schedule (weeldy, t,ri-weeldy, or 
daily) could be found in cities throughout England and North America, not 
to mention Scotland, Ireland, and the West Indies. These newspapers dis-
cussed public affairs more openly than their seventeenth-century counter-
parts, and they contained a range of material that previously appeared in 
distinct publications: paragraphs of foreign and domestic news, price lists and 
mortality figures, accounts of crimes and trials, poems and songs, reader 
correspondence, parliamentary proceedings, political essays, and advertise-
ments. Pamphlets and broadsides continued to be used for late-breaking news 
or for certain genres, such as the last words of executed criminals. But by 1775 
the newspaper had become the primary means of packaging 'news and selling 
it to customers. 
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